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Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2013 17:53:02 +0200
From: Mathias Krause <>
Cc:, Petr Matousek <>
Subject: Re: Re: Linux kernel: more net info leak fixes for v3.9

On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 3:57 PM, P J P <> wrote:
> +-- On Mon, 22 Apr 2013, Mathias Krause wrote --+
> | partly... Have a look at verify_iovec()/verify_compat_iovec(). They're
> | updating the msg_name and msg_iov pointers.
>   I did, both seem to use user supplied `msg_namelen' value to copy contents
> from user `msg_name' to `sockaddr_storage addr' variable. And when
> `msg_namelen' is zero(0) msg_name is set to NULL. Later same `msg_namelen'
> bytes are copied to user area, right?

No. It is capped in move_addr_to_user() to the actual size -- if set
by the protocol -- or sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) -- whichever is

> Ah..right, both are called with `mode = VERIFY_WRITE' and both initialise
> `addr' variable when mode = VERIFY_READ.
> If it's copying user data to `addr', why selectively do it when mode =

It's called with VERIFY_READ in __sys_sendmsg() because in this case
"addr" is an input parameter. For recvmsg() it's an output parameter
so doesn't need to be read, but only written to.

> Also, wouldn't - memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr)) - fix this leak for all
> definitions of <proto>_recvmsg() routine??

Yes, but see this discussion:


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