Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2013 15:45:31 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <>
To: Brian Martin <>
Subject: Re: Summary of security bugs (now fixed) in user namespaces

On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 3:34 PM, Brian Martin
<> wrote:
> Andy;
> : I previously reported these bugs privatley.  I'm summarizing them for
> : the historical record.  These bugs were never exploitable on a
> : default-configured released kernel, but some 3.8 versions are
> : vulnerable depending on configuration.
> Do you know if these were patched, and therefore possibly disclosed via the
> commits? With these details, it is difficult to line them up to existing
> reports.

Bug 1 should be fixed in:

commit 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d
Author: Eric W. Biederman <>
Date:   Fri Mar 15 01:45:51 2013 -0700

    userns:  Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted

Bug 2 is should be fixed by these:

commit 90563b198e4c6674c63672fae1923da467215f45
Author: Eric W. Biederman <>
Date:   Fri Mar 22 03:10:15 2013 -0700

    vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts

commit 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9
Author: Eric W. Biederman <>
Date:   Fri Mar 22 04:08:05 2013 -0700

    vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces

Bug 3 should be fixed in:

commit 92f28d973cce45ef5823209aab3138eb45d8b349
Author: Eric W. Biederman <>
Date:   Fri Mar 15 01:03:33 2013 -0700

    scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.

Bug 4 isn't yet public... (it's unpatched so far and it's considerably
more severe than any of these).


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.