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Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 10:16:54 -0800
From: Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request - Linux kernel: VFAT slab-based
 buffer overflow

On Tue, Feb 26, 2013 at 11:56:02AM -0600, Joshua J. Drake wrote:
> All,
> 
> I'd like to request a CVE for an issue leading to a buffer overflow of
> a slab allocated buffer in the VFAT file system code. The issue
> manifests when converting UTF8 characters to UTF16 inside the
> "utf8s_to_utf16s" function. Reaching this code requires writing to a
> VFAT partition that has been mounted with the "utf8" option. Ubuntu
> 10.04 mounts USB sticks with this option by default. Most Android
> devices mount eMMC/SD cards/etc with this option.
> 
> The issue affects kernels prior to 3.2. Many Android devices remain
> affected today.
> 
> I'm not entirely sure when the issue was introduced at this moment. It
> appears to have been introduced here:
> http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=commitdiff;h=74675a58507e769beee7d949dbed788af3c4139d
> 
> The issue was fixed here:
> http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=commitdiff;h=0720a06a7518c9d0c0125bd5d1f3b6264c55c3dd
> 
> The issue was partially disclosed here (this spurred my investigation):
> http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/23248/
> 
> Props to G13 for finding it. It's pretty disappointing that
> Google/Android security teams (and of course Linux maintainers) didn't
> responsibly disclose the issue so other Linux kernel packagers could
> package a fix.

Ok, how could the Linux maintainers have done anything about this, when
the developers involved in creating this patch didn't even realize it
was a "security" issue in the first place?

I'm tired of people complaining about how the Linux kernel developers
handle security issues, when no one seems to have a suggestion as to how
anything could actually be done better.

And note, I was one of the people involved in this patch, and I didn't
notice anything special about it, so if you want to blame anyone, blame
me for not tagging it for inclusion in the stable kernel releases.

greg k-h

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