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Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2013 16:53:43 -0700
From: Vincent Danen <>
To: "Christey, Steven M." <>
Cc: "" <>
Subject: Re: CVE request: python-pyrad insecurities

* [2013-02-15 19:51:07 +0000] Christey, Steven M. wrote:

>These two issues were fixed in the same diff and reflect poor randomness - should we have only assigned one CVE?  (If the RADIUS feature was introduced in different versions than the authenticator-password feature, then maybe the SPLIT is acceptable.)

I'm not sure.  I didn't go digging to see when they were introduced --
both features may have been introduced at the same time (or not).

Ok, so doing a quick peek at the first full blob of it in git:

The use of random.randrange() is in both the CreateAuthenticator() and
CreateID() functions, so I would bet that they've been like that the
whole time (that blob is from Sept 2007).  So I guess one CVE is
probably sufficient.

I only noted them as two issues as we had two separate bug reports about

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Kurt Seifried []
>Sent: Friday, February 15, 2013 2:37 PM
>Cc: Vincent Danen
>Subject: Re: [oss-security] CVE request: python-pyrad insecurities
>Hash: SHA1
>On 02/15/2013 09:14 AM, Vincent Danen wrote:
>> Could a CVE be assigned to the following two issues please?
>> #1:
>> Nathaniel McCallum of Red Hat reported that pyrad was using
>> Python's random module in a number of places to generate
>> pseudo-random data.  In the case of the authenticator data, it was
>> being used to secure a password sent over the wire.  Because
>> Python's random module is not really suited for this purpose (not
>> random enough), it could lead to password hashing that may be
>> predictable.
>Please use CVE-2013-0294 for this issue.
>> #2:
>> Nathaniel McCallum of Red Hat reported that pyrad was creating
>> serialized RADIUS packet IDs in the CreateID() function in
>> This is not suitable for RADIUS as the RFC specifies
>> that the ID must not be predictable.  As a result, the ID of the
>> next packet sent can be spoofed.
>Please use CVE-2013-0295 for this issue.
>> These have been corrected in upstream's forthcoming version 2.1
>> via:
>- --
>Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
>PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
>Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (GNU/Linux)

Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team 

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