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Date: Fri, 04 Jan 2013 12:34:35 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Tim Waugh <twaugh@...hat.com>, Jiri Popelka <jpopelka@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request - cups:  'Listen localhost:631' option
 not honoured correctly on IPv6-enabled systems when systemd used for CUPS
 socket activation

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 01/04/2013 08:29 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
> 
> during the process of CUPS socket activation code refactoring in
> favour of systemd capability a security flaw was found in the way
> CUPS service honoured Listen localhost:631 cupsd.conf configuration
> option. The setting was recognized properly for IPv4-enabled
> systems, but failed to be correctly applied for IPv6-enabled
> systems. As a result, a remote attacker could use this flaw to
> obtain (unauthorized) access to the CUPS web-based administration 
> interface.
> 
> References: [1] https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=795624 
> [2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=891942
> 
> Note: Obviously this would affect only instances, where CUPS was
> instructed to pass its socket activation code to systemd (instances
> not using systemd would not be affected by this problem).
> 
> Could you allocate a CVE identifier for this?
> 
> Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat
> Security Response Team
> 

Please use CVE-2012-6094 for this issue. The novell bug is from 2012.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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