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Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2012 11:09:40 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@...onical.com>, coley@...us.mitre.org,
        security <security@...ntu.com>
Subject: Re: CVE request: perl-modules

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On 12/11/2012 09:56 AM, Jamie Strandboge wrote:
> Debian recently fixed the following security bug: 
> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=695224
> 
> "Locale::Maketext is a core l10n library that expands templates
> found in strings.
> 
> Two problems were found, reported, and patched-for by Brian Carlson
> of cPanel, and these fixes are now in blead and on the CPAN.
> 
> The commit in question is 
> http://perl5.git.perl.org/perl.git/commit/1735f6f53ca19f99c6e9e39496c486af323ba6a8
>
>  The flaws are:
> 
> * in a [method,x,y,z] template, the method could be a
> fully-qualified name * template expansion did not properly quote
> metacharacters, allowing code injection through a malicious
> template
> 
> Please upgrade your Locale::Maketext, especially if you allow
> user-provided templates."

One of our guys has had a chance to look into this:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=884354

Petr Pisar 2012-12-06 10:08:20 EST

Created attachment 658787 [details]
Template for reproducer

Could show the attack vector? Attached is small code showing how to
use Locale::Maketext. Please modify it to explain the vulnerability.

I think the vulnerability is effective only when attacker has first
argument of maketext() under control.

However that means the attacker can run any code even without this
`vulnerability'. It's like saying glibc's gettext() is vulnerable. But
that's not true.

Sure gettext("%s", user_input) is not safe, but this is flaw in the
caller, not in the gettext. The same applies to
Locale::Maketext::maketext().

Petr Pisar 2012-12-06 11:18:46 EST

And actually the patch breaks behaviour because it forbids
cross-package calls which were explicitly allowed and documented
before. I disbelieve the patch is good candidate for stable distributions.


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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