Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2012 08:51:35 +0100 From: Sergei Golubchik <serg@...monty.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>, king cope <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com>, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, todd@...ketstormsecurity.org, submit@...sec.com, Mitre CVE assign department <cve-assign@...re.org>, Steven Christey <coley@...re.org>, security@...iadb.org, security@...ql.com, Ritwik Ghoshal <ritwik.ghoshal@...cle.com>, moderators@...db.org Subject: Re: Re: [Full-disclosure] MySQL (Linux) Stack based buffer overrun PoC Zeroday Hi, king cope! On Dec 02, king cope wrote: > Hi, > My opinion is that the FILE to admin privilege elevation should be > patched. What is the reason to have FILE and ADMIN privileges > seperated when with this exploit FILE privileges equate to ALL ADMIN > privileges. > I understand that it's insecure to have FILE privileges attached to a > user. But if this a configuration issue and not a vulnerability then > as stated above there must be something wrong with the privilege > management in this SQL server. You've missed that part of my reply: > > Additionally, MySQL (and MariaDB) provides a --secure-file-priv > > option that allows to restrict all FILE operations to a specific > > directory. Normally, if a DBA wants to grant FILE privilege to users, the server will have something like secure-file-priv=/tmp/mysql (for example) specified in the configuration file. This way any operation allowed by the FILE privilege (like SELECT ... OUTFILE) will only be able to access files under the /tmp/mysql/ path. Regards, Sergei
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