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Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2012 00:58:59 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Raphael Geissert <geissert@...ian.org>, Tomas Hoger <thoger@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE request: opencryptoki insecure lock files
handling
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 09/24/2012 10:50 PM, Raphael Geissert wrote:
> On Thursday 20 September 2012 09:10:14 Tomas Hoger wrote:
>> Ok, so I think we need 1 CVE for the two insecure temporary file
>> uses, unless we want to split each temporary file issue under a
>> separate CVE. I don't believe there's a real need to assign CVE
>> for 2.4.1 (which did not improve things on systems with world
>> writable /var/lock) or 2.4.2 (which re-opens the attack for
>> pkcs11 group members on systems with restricted /var/lock, but
>> improves things on systems with world writable /var/lock).
>
> I think two ids is more appropriate given that the issue isn't
> fixed in 2.4.1 for systems with world writable /var/lock. 2.4.2, on
> the other hand, covers boths scenarios (given that pkcs11 group
> membership is already considered root-equivalent.)
>
> Regards,
Apologies for the late reply.
I'm going to assign 2 CVE's:
Please use CVE-2012-4454 for opencryptoki insecure lock files handling
in /tmp in 2.4.0
Please use CVE-2012-4455 for opencryptoki insecure lock files handling
in /var/tmp in 2.4.1
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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