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Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 17:39:57 +0200
From: Tavis Ormandy <>
To: Vincent Danen <>
Subject: Re: note on gnome shell extensions

On Mon, Sep 10, 2012 at 02:48:38PM -0600, Vincent Danen wrote:
> * [2012-09-08 18:14:10 -0600] Kurt Seifried wrote:
> SUSE has some interesting info in their bug:
> By the sounds of it, this should be harmless.  Vincent Untz says that
> the browser plugin doesn't actually install the extensions, it's passed
> to another process via a dbus call to gnome-shell, which sends the uuid
> of the extension to the web site in order to
> download the extension.
> See:
> which is:
> let message = Soup.form_request_new_from_hash('GET', REPOSITORY_URL_INFO, params);
> And REPOSITORY_URL_INFO is hardcoded earlier:
> const REPOSITORY_URL_DOWNLOAD = REPOSITORY_URL_BASE + '/download-extension/';
> const REPOSITORY_URL_INFO     = REPOSITORY_URL_BASE + '/extension-info/';
> const REPOSITORY_URL_UPDATE   = REPOSITORY_URL_BASE + '/update-info/';
> I don't think this is something that can be exploited, based on the
> above.

Not sure I follow the logic, can't I just upload something malicious to and then force you to download it? I mean, I can
try it if you're not convinced it's possible.

They surely do not have a magical technique for determining if my code
is or can become malicious.


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