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Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2012 11:11:44 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <>
CC: Ludwig Nussel <>
Subject: Re: libdbus hardening

On 07/30/2012 10:59 AM, Ludwig Nussel wrote:
> Florian Weimer wrote:
>> On 07/17/2012 12:08 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
>>> Note that GNU libc will likely change the name to secure_getenv.
>>> Upstream does not want to document __secure_getenv as-is.
>> This will be part of glibc 2.17.  autoconf instructions are available here:
>> <>
> Now the next step would be to make glibc automatically use secure_getenv
> when running setuid root and require programs to explicitly call
> insecure_getenv() or something like that :-)

You're welcome to absorb the transition costs. 8-) I looked into this 
briefly, and the potentially insecure getenv calls are not in the 
majority, so we'd have to expect quite a bit of breakage, or at least 
add a configurable whitelist of variable names in a file in /etc.

FWIW, I consider PAM and NSS (Name Service Switch) the major problem 
areas, too.  Do you know if the APIs would allow confining plug-ins to 
subprocesses?  Then we only have to solve the transparent child process 

Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team

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