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Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2012 09:55:51 +0200
From: Sebastian Krahmer <>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <>,
	Kurt Seifried <>,
	Marcus Meissner <>,
	Dan Rosenberg <>
Subject: Re: Re: ecryptfs headsup

Indeed, there are various issues in the ecryptfs tool that made me scratch
my head but are not serious vulnerabilities and cannot be fixed so easily
w/o rewriting the entire file handling. Yes, some of the checks could
probably be removed.
So the main focus was that its runs with euid of the user. :)
The one real issue was the missing MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV.


On Sat, Jul 14, 2012 at 07:41:44AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Hi,
> There's another almost-hole (almost, like the umount env clearing)
> that the patch in that bug report fixes:
> At line 538, this code is added:
> 	if (strstr(alias, "..")) {
> 		fputs("Invalid alias", stderr);
> 		exit(1);
> 	}
> Ostensibly this is to prevent the subsequent call to
>         lock_counter(pwd->pw_name, uid, alias);
> from crafting the path name like this:
>        asprintf(&f, "%s/%s-%s-%s", TMP, FSTYPE, u, alias)
> where alias might have ".." in it, and then making a file like this:
>       open(f, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW, 0600)
> which takes special care to specify O_NOFOLLOW too, and then
> afterwards, it checks to see if it's owned by the correct user and
> makes certain it's a regular file.
> Fortunately, the call at the beginning of the program to seteuid(uid)
> prevents this from being too traumatic. But, the strstr check was
> added apparently as a security consideration; correct me if I'm
> mistaken.
> There's actually one use of the alias variable before such sanitation
> that is almost a big hole, but isn't, due again to the seteuid(uid) at
> the beginning of the program. At line 525 we have:
> if (read_config(pwd->pw_dir, uid, alias, &src, &dest, &opts2) < 0) {
> read_config forms a file name like this:
> if (asprintf(&fnam, "%s/.ecryptfs/%s.conf", pw_dir, alias) < 0) {
> It then makes a smart security check to ensure that it's not a symlink
> and that it's owned by uid:
> if (stat(fnam, &mstat)!=0 || (!S_ISREG(mstat.st_mode) || mstat.st_uid!=uid)) {
>     fputs("Bad file\n", stderr);
>     free(fnam);
>     return -1;
> }
> After it does this, it opens the file for reading with a standard fopen:
> fin = fopen(fnam, "r");
> And then it reads the various settings out of fin.
> There's a race condition on fnam, since you could make fnam a valid
> file, but immediately after the stat(2) call, swap it for a symlink.
> I'm not sure this is really an issue, though, since geteuid(uid) has
> already been called, so it's not as if the subsequent fopen is allowed
> to read just any file. It does pose the question, though, of why that
> stat check is there in the first place, if it can be subverted like
> that. The solution is just to open the fd first, and then check the
> permissions and whatnot with fstat(2).
> Jason Donenfeld


~ perl
~ $_='print"\$_=\47$_\47;eval"';eval
~ - SuSE Security Team

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