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Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 15:13:41 -0700
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>,
Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>,
Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>
Subject: Re: ecryptfs headsup
On 2012-07-10 16:48:26, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> On 07/10/2012 10:30 AM, Marcus Meissner wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 04:21:13PM +0200, Sebastian Krahmer wrote:
> >>
> >> It is a potential privilege escalation since the pam module
> >> was not setting uid/gid(list) appropriately and the suid
> >> binary did not clear environment before exec'ing umount.
> >> I do not know whether MS_NOSUID was really needed (and maybe
> >> MS_NODEV is, but I was not able to create dev files).
> >> Unfortunally we found ecryptfs not really stable inside the kernel
> >> and Marcus is still rebooting :)
> >
> > This means ...
> >
> > So far we have not yet found a specific security issue.
> >
> > Ciao, Marcus
> >
>
> This reminds me...
>
> If an unprivileged user can mount ecryptfs shares (e.g. via the setuid-root
> mount helper shipped on Ubuntu) and has the ability to mount user-controlled
> filesystems (either network filesystems via setuid mount helpers like mount.cifs
> or mount.nfs, or formatted USB drives via physical access), it's possible to
> escalate privileges to root because the setuid ecryptfs helper does not mount
> filesystems with the nosuid or nodev flags.
>
> An attacker can create an ecryptfs filesystem on his own machine on a network
> filesystem or USB drive, and then mount that ecryptfs filesystem on the victim
> machine for a setuid-root backdoor. Hard-coding nosuid and nodev into the
> setuid ecryptfs helper would resolve this, but I'm not sure that's workable for
> Ubuntu home directories.
This vulnerability is limited to physical access via formatted USB
drives because the eCryptfs filesystem code does not work on top of
network filesystems.
Additionally, I believe that the encrypted home source and destination
mount points were hard-coded up until ecryptfs-utils version 86.
Versions before that should not be vulnerable to the setuid-root binary
on a USB drive attack mentioned above.
Dustin - Would you have any objections to forcing the nosuid and nodev
mount options in the mount.ecryptfs_private helper?
Tyler
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