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Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 15:58:46 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: libdbus hardening
On 07/10/2012 03:43 PM, Solar Designer wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 03:13:55PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> Perhaps we can put a getenv_secure() into libc, which will perform all
>> the appropriate checks (including future checks we do not know about
>> yet)? Duplicating the code in many libraries does not seem prudent.
>
> We already have __secure_getenv() in glibc, which I think is what
> libraries like this should be using on systems with glibc.
Sebastian's patches also include a check on prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE). I'm
not sure if the libc approach (compare effective and real UIDs/GIDs on
process start and base process environment trust decisions on that) is
equivalent.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
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