Date: Fri, 04 May 2012 10:08:53 -0600 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> Subject: Re: Debian/Ubuntu php_crypt_revamped.patch -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 So I'm guessing this needs a CVE #? On 05/04/2012 09:31 AM, Solar Designer wrote: > Hi, > > Boaz Rymland reported to me what he thought was a phpass bug, where > any password would be valid when authenticated against a NULL or > empty password hash. (Indeed, the password hash shouldn't normally > be NULL or empty, but it is better for authentication code to be > fail-close rather than fail-open.) At first, I was not able to > reproduce the problem, but after exchanging a few e-mails we were > able to narrow it down to PHP crypt() call returning an empty > string when called with NULL or an empty string for the salt > argument on Boaz' Ubuntu 11.04 system with php5 5.3.5-1ubuntu7.7. > I was still not able to reproduce that on other systems (with other > versions of PHP). > > Today, I downloaded and built clean PHP 5.3.5 on an Owl system. I > still could not trigger the problem. Then I applied > debian/patches/php_crypt_revamped.patch from Debian's > php5_5.3.5-1.diff.gz - and the problem finally appeared. > > Original: > > php@owl:~ $ ~/php-5.3.5/bin/php -r 'echo crypt("pass", null), > "\n";' $1$l5Nwx5hu$NhostJ7i8jP1B.4C4zaiM78. > > With Debian patch: > > php@owl:~ $ ~/php-5.3.5-debian/bin/php -r 'echo crypt("pass", > null), "\n";' > > php@owl:~ $ > > (empty string was printed). > > It turns out that the patch first appeared in Debian's 5.3.2-1 in > response to almost a non-issue (different behavior across PHP > versions for an invalid salt string) and general feeling that PHP > should be using system-provided crypto instead of its bundled code > when possible (questionable to me: each approach has its pros and > cons): > > http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=572601 > > The handling of NULL/empty salt strings was corrected in 5.3.6-1, > as well as in 5.3.3-7+squeeze4 (stable-security): > > http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=581170 > > Apparently, that fix never made it into Ubuntu 11.04 updates - so > I guess this should happen now. > > Overall, the patch looks problematic to me. Here's another problem > with it, still reproducible on 5.3.10-1ubuntu3 (Ubuntu 12.04): > > user@...ntu:~$ php -r 'echo crypt("pass", "_J9..Salt"), "\n";' > _J9..Saltr2Hq6I3ZH0s user@...ntu:~$ php -r 'echo crypt("pass", > "_J9..Saltr2Hq6I3ZH0s"), "\n";' _J0LlWX63dRZg > > That non-security bug is with the "salt_len == 9" check added with > the patch. So phpass' authentication against CRYPT_EXT_DES hashes, > which it tries to support, would be failing on Debian/Ubuntu > systems. I guess I need to introduce a workaround for it now, > complicating the code. :-( > > I think it may be best to drop this patch from further versions of > Debian/Ubuntu - and not reintroduce it even in response to the > likely "bug" reports from Debian users complaining about the > behavior change from previous versions of Debian. > > I agree that the code in upstream PHP may need improvement, but > that patch does not improve it, and the deviation from upstream is > bad. Altering the behavior of PHP on specific distros beyond what > may normally happen due to PHP's ./configure is undesirable and > should only be done for very good reasons. > > Sorry for the rant. > > Alexander - -- Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT) PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJPo/8VAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmTQyoP/jQqdJ6VeZe5cCcjElPQt5AN 37zVkxkY0x5TZLhrrlWmuTGfeYKe9JitWlntQ8Ju9gaTcX6/pzRqRD7pmYkRyV2Q 3hYXd+wMgirNxA+AjgePa+MqQBStpcg4mBeRcUx6fUjVzSLSYMlPgUKABXoEuDFM 1kpYdz+1DTQlmSaV+SCQ11KUfIisNVJl1DzJrlneu27JrKbjf8TDLoxi4yuJyXNL ZEG+aUQtpo9H+oAP8UnAP2iUlvAKpAqdf44vyBRLHMs0DW8zTCYhINg6TNZXokne KzJ58tmGcW39nCC4BgYTK0C28ZsI7i1XGk+3ABuVMngFaDz8wXBRfx0Ht++TKED3 zMkzeKeyKYfU8XSO6xt6aOUbXW2wLu5JAevdO/Bhe0aTvZJtHiFL2ocI8tyJN8Av 9Ru66u8vD3hDslkn676MvZTIlrlR/gtBTOFHnjl233zaMERakH2ktxWgobr9qU2i 9yN9ZYEUXVZv5wlJEK48c0pd337/gcDdcbGF4bFQ2AqfBt6RX+LKdgpxKH/9DztU YWA8sKu9yQ0UJ+PWLroDcoo92Q1XxmNN9LM5+4O+QgXnsNgwXo9BdTopfrcuuJr8 OCkxcDt4nayz2aT1VGoid2hY7vQohaS24Yf3NILhx+cUiZDlPM24xpGN1FukWvlq RjYAtiCy3B7zyNEZBzxl =XSLr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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