Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 11:19:38 -0600 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@...e.de> CC: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Zubin Mithra <zubin.mithra@...il.com>, Dhanesh k <dhanesh1428@...il.com> Subject: Re: CVE-Request taglib vulnerabilities On 03/21/2012 09:42 AM, Ludwig Nussel wrote: > Zubin Mithra wrote: >> [...] >> The issues which are present in the latest "release" but not in the current >> development head were :- >> >>  Lack of sanity checks of fields which were read, and were used for >> allocating memory; crafted files would lead of application crash. > > Not an issue according to upstream: > http://mail.kde.org/pipermail/taglib-devel/2012-March/002187.html Shouldn't it simply say "file to large" or "unable to allocate blah" something rather than crashing? I assume by "large" file the file doesn't actually need to be large, just the header information needs to claim it is large? >>  A one bit change in a working ogg file would cause a thread to loop >> infinitely. > > http://mail.kde.org/pipermail/taglib-devel/2012-March/002191.html > https://github.com/taglib/taglib/commit/b3646a07348ffa276ea41a9dae03ddc63ea6c532 Has this been confirmed? Does the looping thread actually cause a DoS, simply slow down the application a bit, or? > cu > Ludwig -- Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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