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Date: Mon, 05 Mar 2012 15:30:43 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
"Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
Roland Gruber <post@...andgruber.de>,
Fabio Tranchitella <kobold@...ian.org>,
Dmitry Butskoy <Dmitry@...skoy.name>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- LDAP Account Manager Pro / PhpLDAPadmin
-- Multiple XSS flaws
On 03/05/2012 03:36 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
>
> originally (2012-03-01), the following cross-site (XSS) flaws were
> reported
> against LDAP Account Manager Pro (from Secunia advisory [1]):
>
> * 1) Input passed to e.g. the "filteruid" POST parameter when filtering
> result
> sets in lam/templates/lists/list.php (when "type" is set to a valid
> value) is
> not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be
> exploited
> to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in
> context of an affected site.
>
> * 2) Input passed to the "filter" POST parameter in
> lam/templates/3rdParty/pla/htdocs/cmd.php (when "cmd" is set to "export"
> and
> "exporter_id" is set to "LDIF") is not properly sanitised before being
> returned
> to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script
> code in
> a user's browser session in context of an affected site.
Please use CVE-2012-1114 for these two issues (XSS, same reporter)
> * 3) Input passed to the "attr" parameter in
> lam/templates/3rdParty/pla/htdocs/cmd.php (when "cmd" is set to
> "add_value_form" and "dn" is set to a valid value) is not properly
> sanitised
> before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute
> arbitrary
> HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected
> site.
Please use CVE-2012-1115 for this vu;n (XSS, but different reporter)
> References:
> [1] http://secunia.com/advisories/48221/
> [2] http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=458
>
> Later (2012-03-03), it was reported:
> [3] http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=662050#15
>
> that subset (for 'export', 'add_value_form', and 'dn' variables) of these
> security flaws is applicable also against the code of PhpLDAPadmin, a
> web-based
> LDAP client.
>
> Patches from LDAP Account Manager, which are applicable to PphLDAPAdmin:
> [4]
> http://lam.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/lam/lam/templates/3rdParty/pla/lib/export_functions.php?r1=1.4&r2=1.5
>
>
> [5]
> http://lam.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/lam/lam/templates/3rdParty/pla/htdocs/export.php?r1=1.1&r2=1.2
>
>
> [6]
> http://lam.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/lam/lam/templates/3rdParty/pla/htdocs/add_value_form.php?r1=1.6&r2=1.7
>
>
> I would swear, I have seen LDAP Account Manager CVE request on OSS
> security mailing list
> recently, but can't find it now quickly right now. Kurt, please prior
> assigning CVE ids
> to "LDAP Account Manager Pro" please double check the main CVE mitre
> database, if these
> didn't get a CVE identifier yet.
>
> Wrt to PhpLDAPAdmin side -- I am not sure, what's the relation of the
> code between LAM and
> PLA (if PLA is using / embedding some code of LAM directly or if there
> were also some
> customizations on the side of PLA upon LAM code embedding / inclusion).
> Hopefully Roland,
> Fabio, Dmitry can clarify here, how much the PhpLDAPAdmin code is
> different from LDAP
> Account Manager code (if it's just overtaken LAM code or PhpLDAPAdmin
> have also made
> their own customizations to the code)?
>
> Roland, Fabio, Dmitry, basically what we are searching an answer for is,
> if the PhpLDAPAdmin
> code is different enough it safe to be considered as a different code
> base and separate
> CVE identifier to be allocated for it? (IOW one for LDAP Account Manager
> Pro issues,
> the other for PhpLDAPAdmin issues)
>
> Kurt, once the above doubt solved and you checked and confirmed, that
> LDAP Account Manager
> issue did not get CVE identifier in the recent past yet, could you
> allocate those?
>
> Thank you && Regards, Jan.
> --
> Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team
--
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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