oss-security - CVE Status Clarification / Request -- kadu: Stored XSS by parsing contact's status and sms messages in history

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Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 11:05:57 +0100
From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>
To: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Mariusz Fik <fisiu@...nsuse.org>,
        Rafał Malinowski
 <rafal.przemyslaw.malinowski@...il.com>
CC: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
        Radoslaw Lisowski <radoslaw.lisowski@...il.com>
Subject: CVE Status Clarification / Request -- kadu: Stored XSS by parsing
 contact's status and sms messages in history

Hello Mariusz, Kurt, Steve, vendors,

   [1] though https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=749036#c0
   mentions CVE identifier has been already requested for this:

   "The bug still doesn't have CVE number but will have in near future."

   it doesn't look like CVE id has been requested for this via OSS
   security list, so moving this discussion / CVE request there.

   Mariusz, could you clarify, if this issue has got a CVE identifier
   already or if we still need one? If aren't able to do so, whom
   should we contact to be clear about "CVE request status" for this?

   Or at least clarify which list that "Here is a part of massage sent
   by developers to package maintainers:" has been sent to? (so
   we could ask there)

   And in the end either use that one, already allocated or allocate
   a new one here via OSS.

   Below being issue description as I got it based on / from [2]:

   A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw was found in the way Kadu, the instant
messenger compatible with the Gadu-Gadu protocol, performed sanitization of
status and sms messages for particular contact in user's history. A remote
attacker could provide a specially-crafted status or sms message, which would
be stored in victim's Kadu history file, if the attacker was present on the
contact list of the victim and the victim has had storage of statuses enabled
for their history file. When the victim later examined the content of the
status history, this flaw could lead to arbitrary HTML or webscript execution.

References:
[2] https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=749036
[3] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=797777

Upstream patches:
[4] https://gitorious.org/kadu/kadu/commit/ebe3674cf0f3aa9b36308c06e19cb293cc790b52
     (patch for the XSS issue)

[5] https://gitorious.org/kadu/kadu/commit/e9506be6d3dcdd408fdf83d8eb82416c9b798c84
     (additional hardening)

[6] https://gitorious.org/kadu/kadu/commit/91772e46541e22cbc2c7bf41a1a9798c2a58f6d6
     (disable xhtmlrequests)

[7] https://gitorious.org/kadu/kadu/commit/94e7479617d78a1649a0763960edade7ad09a0d0
    (allow only GET and HEADER requests, additional hardening)

Thank you && Regards, Jan.
--
Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team

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