Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 12:29:17 +0200 From: Henri Salo <henri@...v.fi> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: glibc crypt(3), crypt_r(3), PHP crypt() may use alloca() On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 06:22:17AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote: > On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 06:13:24AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote: > > Alternatively, crypt(3) and crypt_r(3) (and the reference code for > > SHA-crypt?) could refuse to work on overly long key or/and salt strings, > > but then the question is what they should do on error. > > Here's another related option: > > if (strlen(key) > 100000 || strlen(salt) > 100000) > abort(); > > (or something like this). Ridiculous? Sure, but it's better than > overwriting another thread's stack or the heap with somewhat higher > lengths, and 100001 chars is not a more reasonable password length to > support than, say, 2 million or 10 million (typical thread stack sizes). > > So if we can't decide on a proper fix (does anyone besides me even > care?), something as trivial as the above would be an improvement. > > Alexander I care, but I don't have much to contribute. Seems valid discussion for this list in my opinion. Best regards, Henri Salo
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