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Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2011 11:33:00 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <>
CC: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request for Calibre

On 11/06/2011 08:11 PM, Kurt Seifried wrote:
> On 11/04/2011 02:45 PM, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>> Just do clarify: Issues 1 through 7.1 (8 issues) were released with the
>> current version that has been out for quite some time now. These
require a
>> CVE. Issues 8 through 14 are ones introduced only during development and
> So to confirm these issues will be assigned a CVE (double checking since
> this has been quite the mess):
>> were not released, and do not need a CVE.
>> So where does that leave us with the CVEs? Well, there are the issues
>> were "released" with a "version" of Calibre, and then the trove of
bugs he
>> introduced in the middle. I'll try to recap and separate which is which:

Ok this is quite the mess but to summarize:

>> 1. Ability to create root owned directory anywhere. The mount helper
>> mkdir(argv[3], ...).

Input validation

>> 2. Ability to remove any empty directory on the system.

Input validation

>> 3. Ability to create user_controlled_dir/.created_by_calibre_mount_helper
>> anywhere on the filesystem.

Input validation

>> 4. Ability to delete user_controlled_dir/.created_by_calibre_mount_helper
>> anywhere on the filesystem.

Input validation

>> 5. Ability to inject arguments into 'mount' being exec'd. On lines
78, 81,
>> and 83, the final two arguments to mount are user controlled. On lines
>> 1033, 106, 108, 139, and 141, the last argument to unmount/eject is user
>> controlled. The "exists()" check can be subverted via race condition
or by
>> creating an existing file in the working directory with a filename
equal to
>> the desired injected argument.

Input validation

>> 6. Ability to execute any program as root. The mount helper makes use of
>> execlp on lines 78, 81, 83, 103, 106, 108, 139, and 141, and the first
>> argument does not start with a / character. Because of this, execlp will
>> search PATH for the executable to run. PATH is user controlled, and
thus it
>> is trivial to write a program that spawns a shell and give it "mount"
as a
>> filename, and direct PATH to its directory.

Untrusted search path

>> 7. Ability to mount any device to anywhere. This leads to local root,
>> you can mount over /etc/ or /etc/pam.d/ or choose-your-own-adventure.

Race condition

>> 7.1. Ability to unmount any device.

Input validation (assuming you mean all the unmount(mp)'s in the code.


So for the input validation issues please use CVE-2011-4124

For the untrusted search path please use CVE-2011-4125

For the race condition please use CVE-2011-4126


-Kurt Seifried / Red Hat Security Response Team

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