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Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 09:34:01 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>, Armin Burgmeier <armin@...39.de>,
        Philipp Kern <phil@...39.de>
Subject: Re: CVE request: 3 flaws in libobby and libnet6

On 10/30/2011 06:08 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 1) the libobby's server checks for users' color collisions before
> checking users' passwords.  Any user without password authentication
> may check whether a specific color is used by someone.  With knowledge
> of person's color preferences he may learn whether a specific person
> uses the server.  Also, he may enumerate all default colors and learn
> the number of users.
>
>     inc/server_buffer.hpp: 
>
>     bool basic_server_buffer<Document, Selector>::on_auth()
>     {
>     ...
>         // Check colour
>         if(!basic_buffer<Document, Selector>::check_colour(colour) )
>         {
>             error = login::ERROR_COLOUR_IN_USE;
>             return false;
>         }
>
>         // Check global password
>         if(!m_global_password.empty() )
>         {
>             if(global_password != m_global_password)
>             {
>                 error = login::ERROR_WRONG_GLOBAL_PASSWORD;
>                 return false;
>             }
>         }
>     ...
>     }
>
>
Please use CVE-2011-4091 for this issue.

> 2) libobby doesn't check server's SSL certificate and passes the
> password in plain text over SSL channel.  All remote clients are
> vulnerable to a MITM attack.
>
>     • The attacker (A) learns the client's (C) and the server's (S) IP
>         addresses and used ports.
>     • A breaks the established TCP connection between C and S.
>     • A changes the way C's packets with dst = S are routed, resulting
>         in all packets from C to S's IP go to A.  The simplest way is
>         ARP cache poisoning.
>     • A starts listening on the same IP:port as S did.
>     • C notices the connection interruption and tries to reconnect to S.
>         (Note: if the client is gobby, this step needs user's interaction.)
>     • As all C's packets intended for S are routed to A, so, in reality
>         C connects to A, not S.
>     • C starts SSL session and, as C doesn't check SSL certificate, he
>         think it talks to S.
>     • A requests C' password.
>     • C passes the password in plain text over SSL channel.
>
Please use CVE-2011-4092 for this issue
> 3) libnet6 doesn't check basic_server::id_counter for integer overflow.
> This number is used to distinguish among different users.  An attacker
> may open UINT_MAX successive connections and get an identifier of the
> already established connection, resulting in the connection hijacking.
> On i686 uint is a 32 bit counter, so an attacker should be able to open
> 4.000.000.000 connections to complete the attack.  This is a rather big
> number: if an attacker may create 2000 connections per second, it would
> took ~24 days of continuous connection attempts.  However, it is a real
> threat for servers with a huge uptime.
>
Please use CVE-2011-4093 for this issue.

Note: these are all available from http://gobby.0x539.de/trac/wiki/Download
> Thanks,
>


-- 

-Kurt Seifried / Red Hat Security Response Team

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