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Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2011 12:13:39 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: radvd 1.8.2 released with security fixes
Hi Huzaifa,
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 10:15 +0530, Huzaifa Sidhpurwala wrote:
> I dont think so. From the code i have read so far, here is what
> seems to happen.
>
> - radvd starts as root
> - reads the configs
> - if a username is specified (user=radvd in most cases):
> - if "--singleprocess" is not specified:
> - run privsep_init(): This forks another process which
> runs as root. So after this point we have two
> processes both running as root
> - If privsep_init() fails, we have just one process
> running as root
> - run drop_root_privileges():
> If this succedes, we have two processes one running as
> root and another as radvd user, or if privsep_init()
> failed earlier, we have one process running as radvd
> user.
> If this fails, application quits
> - If username was not specified radvd continues to run as a single
> process as root.
>
>
> So failure in privsep_init() results in just one process running as
> radvd user. If it did not fail it would result in one process
> running as root and another as radvd user.
>
> I dont think this would be a security issue in my opinion.
Indeed, if privsep_init() fails the only visible change would be no
future changes to interface settings. I was misled by the option name -
it looks like privsep disabling (opposition to --username), but in
reality it totally disables privileged operations.
Thanks for spotting it, I think CVE-2011-3603 should be rejected.
--
Vasiliy
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