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Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2011 13:45:03 -0400 (EDT)
From: Josh Bressers <>
Cc: Jan Lieskovsky <>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <>,
        Bugs NotHugs <>,
        Stjepan Gros <>,
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- openvas-scanner -- Insecure
 temporary file use by generation of an OVAL system characteristics
 document, when ovaldi support enabled

Let's go with one ID. I don't see a reason to split these.

Use CVE-2011-3351



----- Original Message -----
> On Wednesday 07 Sep 2011 13:13:45 Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> > Hello Josh, Steve, vendors,
> >
> >    it was reported that the scanner module for the Open
> >    Vulnerability
> > Assessment System (OpenVAS) used insecure way for creation of a
> > temporary file, when generating OVAL system characteristics document
> > from the knowledge base data available, with the ovaldi integrated
> > tool
> > enabled. A local attacker could use this flaw to conduct symlink
> > attacks to overwrite arbitrary files on the system, accessible with
> > the
> > privileges of the user running the SLAD daemon and / or the ovaldi
> > OVAL
> > interpreter.
> >
> Whilst having a look at the code with regard to the recently reported
> f-d
> issue with OpenVAS, the handling of sc-out.xml in the very same
> function also
> looks insecure. It also doesn't appear to care about races either and
> I'm
> also curious as to whether you can control the contents at all (think
> attacks
> against the ovaldi XML parser). I would suggest that this code needs
> properly
> auditing or removing.
> Unfortunately the interaction with sc-out.xml happens before
> privileges are
> dropped so the malicious activitity occurs as the openvas-scanner user
> (normally root) rather than nobody as in the case of results.xml - The
> call to
> unlink referenced in the f-d email is actually a misnomer as it will
> actually
> only delete the file from /tmp and not whatever it may or may not have
> pointed
> to and the actual writing to the newly race created symlink actually
> happens
> within the ovaldi binary which is spawned as nobody AFAIK.
> Josh/oss-security folk, can I get a CVE for both bugs please. Will we
> need to
> split out the two race conditions as separate CVE? The OpenVAS
> advisory will
> cover both the originally reported nobody case as well as the root
> case
> referenced above.
> Tim
> --
> Tim Brown
> <>
> <>

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