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Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2011 11:32:09 +0200
From: Sebastian Krahmer <>
Subject: lxc + fscaps

Hi Daniel, oss-sec,

I was checking the lxc container framework for some use-cases
and found that it supports usage of containers by users.
It is installed with file caps in this case. (and a lot
of caps indeed, so actually you have almost all caps distributed
across the binaries). Particular interesting of course is
cap_dac_override and it looks like most lxc- binaries are
not really prepared to handle such cases:

linux:~> /sbin/getcap /usr/local/bin/lxc-start
/usr/local/bin/lxc-start = cap_dac_override,cap_fowner,cap_setpcap,\
linux:~> /usr/local/bin/lxc-start -n foo -c /etc/foo /usr/bin/id
lxc-start: failed to spawn 'foo'
linux:~> ls -la /etc/foo
-rw------- 1 jim users 0 Aug 23 09:38 /etc/foo

That means you have a trivial root exploit if lxc is installed for users.
There is a lxc-setuid script too but I guess that the lxc binaries
are similarily not intended for such use.
I dont know whether any distributor ships lxc with file caps, but
probably the tools need some hardening if you want to allow
lxc for users at all. I checked the latest 0.7.5 version.



~ perl
~ $_='print"\$_=\47$_\47;eval"';eval
~ - SuSE Security Team

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