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Date: Sun, 24 Jul 2011 16:50:33 +0200
From: Lukas Fleischer <>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE Request -- cGit -- XSS flaw in rename hint

On Sun, Jul 24, 2011 at 03:56:12PM +0200, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hi Lukas,
>   thank you for this correction.
> On 07/22/2011 10:35 PM, Lukas Fleischer wrote:
> >On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 06:48:38PM +0200, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> >>Hello Josh, Steve, vendors,
> >>
> >>   an cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw was found in the way cgit, a fast
> >>web interface for Git, displayed the file name in the rename hint. A
> >>remote attacker could provide a specially-crafted web page, which once
> >>visited by an authenticated Cgit user, with push access to the
> >>repository, would lead to arbitrary web script or HTML code execution.
> >
> >I think you are a tad off, here. The vulnerability I discovered actually
> >is only exploitable *by* a user with push access as it requires to push
> >a commit that renames any file to a file with a malicious file name.
> Have updated issue description in:
> Hoping of it to sound better now.

Better now. This is how I'd phrase it:

A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in cgit, a fast web
interface for Git, allowing a remote attacker with push access to a
repository to inject arbitrary HTML code. The new file name in rename
hints is not escaped and can be exploited by renaming some file to a
file with specially-crafted file name, thus leading to a permanent XSS.

By the way, this is already fixed in current stable [1] (just because
nobody mentioned it yet).


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