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Date: Wed, 18 May 2011 18:53:23 +0200
From: yersinia <>
Subject: Re: Multiple libraries privilege checking

On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 8:56 PM, Solar Designer <> wrote:

> On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 04:27:41PM +0200, Sebastian Krahmer wrote:
> > Its probably about time to review libraries that are commonly
> > linked to (formerly-) suid programs, such as
> > libldap, libssl etc. In near future, in the advent of file caps
> > they are often lacking proper checks.
> Good idea.
> > They usually just compare uid against euid (not even gid sometimes)
> > and do not check the dumpable flag or AT_SECURE (dont know whether
> > glibc exports a proper function to easily check that at all).
> glibc exports the __libc_enable_secure variable, which is initialized
> based on AT_* including AT_SECURE.  It also exports __secure_getenv().
> > The libraries that I had a quick look at and which were found
> > "vulnerable" are:
> >
> > - openssl-1.0.0c
> We've been patching OpenSSL to use __libc_enable_secure for over 10
> years now. ;-)  The patch is in use at least in Owl and ALT Linux.
> * Sun Apr 22 2001 Solar Designer <>
> ...
> - Use glibc's __libc_enable_secure for the new OPENSSL_issetugid().
> I've attached our patches for OpenSSL, ncurses, S-Lang, termcap, rpm's
> popt.  Of these, OpenSSL and ncurses apply to recent versions, termcap
> is old by itself, whereas the rest might be obsoleted by changes made
> upstream (and they're not strictly for the problem you brought up).
> For OpenSSL, there's another problem: it looks like some getenv()'s
> were added after the initial introduction of OPENSSL_issetugid() and
> without consideration for possible security implications.  Some of those
> should be patched.  This got on my to-do when we updated to OpenSSL
> 1.0.0d earlier this year - to do myself or delegate, but I never got
> around to...  Maybe you're the one to look into this and come up with a
> patch now? ;-)
It happens that I am, with another name, an rpm5/popt comantainer . I am very
interested to integrate these patches, being also a   security
professional. Very
useful to follow this mailing list, but I am not part of a distro, at least
for now, and I can no longer follow it in the future due to the  recent
policy change. Thanks anyway.


> Thanks,

> Alexander

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