Openwall GNU/*/Linux - a small security-enhanced Linux distro for servers
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2011 14:54:19 -0400
From: Michael Gilbert <michael.s.gilbert@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Closed list

Mike O'Connor wrote:

> :I know that there is increasing momentum for the new setup, but I
> :think this solution is wrong.  Its starting to look a lot like the old
> :vendor-sec (too many participants), and drawing an appropriate line for
> 
> How many participants are on security@...nel.org?  How many are part
> of the Mozilla security team?  (And yeah, I know the answer there --
> http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/secgrouplist.html).  There's
> an assumption that "more = worse", but how many is really too many?
> You only get the answer when it seems to stop working.  
> 
> :participation is impossible and seems wrong.
> :
> :The ideal solution to the "too many eyes" problem would be to empower
> 
> The problem with vendor-sec of old seemingly wasn't so much "too many
> eyes" -- more like "too many mouths", too many points of leakage.  It
> wasn't at all clear how much of the vendor-sec leaks were due to any
> one list member in particular (because there were many exploders), bad
> infrastructure, a combination of factors, etc.  Apart from that, it
> seemed to be _mostly_ working, which may be as well as could ever be
> expected in reality.

Two eyes = one mouth (mostly), so yes, there were certainly fewer leaks
per eye than per mouth (pedantically).  Anyway, arguing over the
verbiage to describe the problem isn't going to help resolve it. If I
had to fathom a guess, the probability of leakage is likely to scale
linearly with respect to the number of participants. So the problem is
simply limiting the number of participants to the absolute minimum
necessary. The only way to do that (I think) is to empower the
researcher to make the call for him/herself based on what they know
about their issue. Of course, participants in follow-on discussion can
to expand participation to others if they are affected by the issue at
hand.

> :the researcher (issue submitter) to choose exactly which eyes they want
> :involved.  A way to achieve this would be a ml that accepts only
> 
> The issue there is that some folks don't necessarily have a good
> handle on the issue where they _can_ reasonably target things.  The
> same has sometimes been true even for the coordinating bodies who one
> might think would know better.  Often, it's the vendor/distro reps who
> know the particular nuances of their present and future product better
> than anyone else.  For a sufficiently diverse product base, that kind
> of knowledge is not easy to break down into some checklist ready-made
> for narrow targeting of issues.  

That would be easy enough to solve.  Provide key lists for important
groups (an "open" linux distro key list, an "open+closed" linux provider
key list, an all unix-like os key list, etc.) and pre-cooked one-liners
to encrypt for those sets, then let the researcher choose which one they
want.

> :encrypted messages for participants (participation would be unlimited)
> :and an "archive participant".  The list of participants is open to all
> :(for the purpose of the researcher seeing which keys they want to
> :encrypt for).
> :
> :When sending a message to the list, the researcher has to encrypt the
> 
> Make the barrier for participation high enough for the discoverer of
> an issue (who may not always be a "researcher" in any classic sense)
> and the level of participation will be correspondingly low.  Keep in
> mind that for many of the open source communities that vendor-sec has
> interacted with, security is _not_ their primary focus.  Most people
> write code so they can actually get stuff done.  :)

If documentation is sufficient and pre-cooked commands readily
available, this shouldn't be a problem.  People can (and should) be
able to learn.  Typing "gpg --encrypt --recipient <key 1> --recipient <key 2>"
isn't all that difficult.

> :message for archive key and at least one other valid participant (if
> :not the message should be rejected, and instructions sent with a list of
> :valid participant key fingerprints). In order to make sure the message
> :was validly received, a checksum of the message should be published to
> :an open list (probably oss-sec).  The researcher can check this right
> :away.
> :
> :Finally, the cleartext message should be posted to an open list after a
> :period of time (probably two months max) so that the entire community
> :can see and validate the closed discussion .  This eliminates the
> :possibility of a secret cabal forming or at least empowers the outside
> :world to see the true reality (although with a delay).
> 
> It doesn't _eliminate_ the possibility of any sort of cabal forming.
> It's simply a gesture of good faith, which could be subverted if
> enough like-minded folks decide they need to handle the core of the
> issues reported on the list off-list.  At that point, the list
> archives might turn into some kind of kabuki dance.  To that end, it
> helps to have a bunch of folks on the list who _aren't always_ quite
> so like minded.

The important consequence is that the outside world will be empowered to
see the inner workings of the one unfortunately closed part of an
otherwise completely open system.

If people choose to form a closed group elsewhere, then no one can stop
that, but at least they won't be getting access to communications that
researchers want to keep private (unless there are rogues in the official
list intentionally feeding the other, which of course is always a
possibility, but again that can be addressed by limiting participation
to only those trusted by the researcher).

Keeping it down to one list also reduces the confusion, disparity, and
maintainability of having a bsd list, linux list, etc, etc (which is the
only other suggestion to handle the different needs of the different
potential participants).

Best wishes,
Mike

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Your e-mail address:

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.