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Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2011 18:20:35 +0200
From: Jan Lieskovsky <>
CC: "Steven M. Christey" <>,
        Gerlof Langeveld <>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- atop: Symlink attacks via process
 accounting file

Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Josh, Steve, vendors,
>   atop v1.23 and earlier created process accounting file 
> (/tmp/atop.d/atop.acct)
> in an insecure way. A local attacker could use this flaw to conduct symlink
> attacks (e.g. overwrite arbitrary system files).

Looked more into this issue and seems it may not be possible to misuse this
issue. The steps are below:

tmp]# mkdir /etc/hello
tmp]# ln -s /etc/hello atop.d
tmp]# service atop start
Starting atop: [  OK  ]

But atop detects the /tmp/atop.d directory already exists (/var/log/atop/atop.log contains):
warning: no process exit detection (can not create directory /tmp/atop.d)

So doesn't seem to be exploitable => taking the CVE request back, no CVE needed.

Should have checked this earlier, sorry for the noise.

Regards, Jan.
Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team

> References:
> [1]
> [2]
> [3]
> Could you allocate a CVE id for this?
> Thanks && Regards, Jan.
> -- 
> Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team

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