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Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2011 10:37:48 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...-smtp.mitre.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
cc: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...-smtp.mitre.org>,
        Eugene Teo <eugene@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE request: kernel: multiple issues in ROSE


Pending Dan's followup to my post, we can make CVE-2011-1493 specific to 
Dan's FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS overflow.

- Steve


On Mon, 4 Apr 2011, Josh Bressers wrote:

> One it is then. Thanks.
>
> Use CVE-2011-1493.
>
> --
>    JB
>
> ----- Original Message -----
>> On Mon, Apr 4, 2011 at 2:41 PM, Josh Bressers <bressers@...hat.com>
>> wrote:
>>> How do we want this broken down? If nobody complains, I'll just give
>>> it one.
>>>
>>
>> I think one makes sense, since all the problems were in a single
>> protocol and were addressed at the same time.
>>
>> -Dan
>>
>>> Thanks.
>>>
>>> --
>>>    JB
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> Any update on this?
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Dan
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 12:47 AM, Eugene Teo <eugene@...hat.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> On 03/21/2011 03:40 AM, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I sent in a patch [1] resolving two issues in ROSE:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's
>>>>>> possible
>>>>>> for a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected,
>>>>>> resulting
>>>>>> in heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent
>>>>>> overflows, and abort facilities parsing on failure.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
>>>>>> FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> length of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy
>>>>>> size,
>>>>>> causing a kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> greater than 20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign
>>>>>> array.
>>>>>> Abort facilities parsing on these invalid length values."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> These issues may both result in code execution. They may be
>>>>>> triggered
>>>>>> by a remote attacker if the victim has a listening ROSE socket,
>>>>>> or
>>>>>> by
>>>>>> a local attacker (for privilege escalation) if a ROSE device
>>>>>> exists
>>>>>> (e.g. rose0).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ben Hutchings followed up with a patch [2] that resolves a
>>>>>> number
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> other ROSE issues related to lack of size field validation, some
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> which may also result in heap corruption.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not sure about the proper CVE breakdown for all these issues,
>>>>>> since
>>>>>> the entire protocol was quite broken. Perhaps one is enough to
>>>>>> cover
>>>>>> everything.
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not sure. I would just assign one for the collection of
>>>>> issues
>>>>> here but
>>>>> I will let Steve decide instead.
>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=130060344616926
>>>>>> [2] http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=130063972406389&w=2
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks, Eugene
>>>>> --
>>>>> main(i) { putchar(182623909 >> (i-1) * 5&31|!!(i<7)<<6) &&
>>>>> main(++i); }
>>>>>
>>>
>
>

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