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Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2011 20:10:41 +0300
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE request: kernel: netfilter & econet infoleaks

Hi,

"Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch;  the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1);  the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1).  To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN."
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=129978081009955&w=2


"Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1).  To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN."
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=129978077609894&w=2


"'buffer' string is copied from userspace.  It is not checked whether it is
zero terminated.  This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul().
Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes.

It was introduced before the git epoch.  Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are
root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be
relaxed to e.g. network admin user."
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter&m=129978077509888&w=2
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=130036157327564&w=2


"Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace.  Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked.  When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first bug was introduced before the git epoch;  the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1);  the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1).  To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN."
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=129978086410061&w=2


"struct aunhdr has 4 padding bytes between 'pad' and 'handle' fields on
x86_64.  These bytes are not initialized in the variable 'ah' before
sending 'ah' to the network.  This leads to 4 bytes kernel stack
infoleak.

This bug was introduced before the git epoch."
http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=130036203528021&w=2


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

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