Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2011 06:07:19 -0500 From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Eugene Teo <eugene@...hat.com>, Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com> Subject: Re: Physical access vulnerabilities and auto-mounting On Wednesday, February 23, 2011 12:11:56 am Eugene Teo wrote: > On 02/23/2011 12:17 PM, Dan Rosenberg wrote: > > I originally started writing this as a response to the recent CVE > > requests for issues in partition handling, but thought it might be a > > useful discussion on its own. I was wondering if there are any > > clear-cut policies on issues involving physical access, since these > > can be very difficult in terms of assigning blame. This all sounds like a replay of the month of kernel bugs from back in 2006. I had this new tool that fuzzed file systems. (latest public release is here: http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/files/fsfuzzer-0.7.tar.gz) The discussion at the time went something like this...in order to exploit it, you have to have physical access. If you have physical access, why not put a live CD in and reboot the system? If DoS is what you are after, why not unplug the machine? As far as I know, automounting is not a problem you have to worry about at run level which is most servers. Desktops are different. In run level5, you have the gnome- volume-manager which may want to be overly helpful. If you are at your machine, you should be able to smack anyone hand trying to put something in your USB slot. So, the problem comes when you are away from your desk. I opened this bz in attempt to have that addressed: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=215057 Not a lot in details, but supposed there is a new setting. However, this doesn't help in the scenario where you have a kiosk or internet cafe and untrusted people walk up to machines. It was also pointed out at the time that perhaps iSCSI was another attack vector. > > For example, many Linux distributions will auto-mount filesystems on > > removable storage, often going so far as to load corresponding kernel > > modules for filesystems that aren't compiled in or don't already have > > an LKM loaded. Sometimes, this will happen even if the screen is > > locked. > > > > Incidentally, many Linux filesystem implementations don't have > > especially robust error handling for failures during attempts to mount > > corrupt filesystems. The handling _was_ good until sometime last summer. I found that I could kill just about any file system https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=513624 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=513635 I think there were others, but can't find them. > > As an example, I have a deliberately corrupted > > btrfs filesystem that triggers a BUG() if you attempt to mount it. I > > formatted a USB stick with this filesystem, so now I have a USB stick > > that will panic the kernels of distributions that support > > auto-mounting, in some cases even when the screen is locked. > > > > Should this be considered a vulnerability? Probably. But what should > > be fixed? Should auto-mounting be disabled entirely? You should be able to turn it off. You can also block the loading of any kernel modules for file systems that you know you don't want to load. If you have a bug that alters function pointers or the kernel stack, you have a real vulnerability. I found a couple of those back in 2006. If it simply hits a BUG() or crashes in a way that is not exploitable, you have the same effect as having pulled the power cord. Yes, its a robustness error, but not a security error. > > Is it no longer a vulnerability if auto-mounting is disabled only when the > > screen is > > locked? Should all filesystems have graceful error handling for every > > possible edge case that can occur when dealing with corruption? > > > > I'd be interested to hear opinions on this. And depending on how the > > discussion goes, I'd be happy to provide more details on specific > > cases, such as the btrfs example. > > From the security response perspective, I will likely classify them as > security bugs but with a /very/ low impact. The attacking party must > already have some form of physical access to the affected system, or the > attack must require some social engineering to trick the user to mount a > corrupted file system using a portable media. > > It will be hard to break existing user experience if we were to disable > auto-mounting entirely, but it makes sense to disable it if the screen > is locked. This feature was added a long time ago. (But how does anyone know all the things you can configure in a gnome desktop?) > I'm not sure if this will affect how we classify such bugs. > I'm happy to hear more thoughts on this. MOKB 2006. Not to say that people shouldn't fuzz the file systems and fix all these things. I think I have fuzzing for all major file systems in the fsfuzzer if anyone wanted to go bug hunting. I recently added LVM support, but have not released this newer, more evil fuzzer. -Steve
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