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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 09:43:43 -0800
From: Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Linux kernel proactive security hardening
On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 06:07:38AM +0300, Solar Designer wrote:
> On a more relevant issue (to us), any ideas on dealing with kernel stack
> infoleaks in a general manner (not just plugging the bugs one by one)?
> I guess it could be addressed in gcc (an option to wipe stack frames) or
> in the kernel (wipe even more of the stack, beyond the stack pointer, on
> syscall entry). Unfortunately, either has likely measurable performance
> impact. (BTW, has some of this been implemented somewhere already?)
> Any other ideas?
I haven't seen this, but it seems like a good idea. I'd assume the most
efficient solution would be a compiler modification that did the stack
clearing after raising the stack pointer from a call. I can't imagine it
would be too expensive since that area of the stack should already be in
CPU memory cache.
> In the absence of cheap-enough general solution/workaround in the
> kernel, I'm afraid we'll need to resort to improving and using automated
> tools to detect bugs of this nature - which is apparently what you and
> Vasiliy were doing lately? What tools did you use?
Dan has been using grep. :) I and Vasiliy have been using coccinelle. I am
planning on writing up my adventures soon; I have a giant ruleset for
matching "good" uses of copy_from_user() so that I can manually audit the
less-obviously-correct uses.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team
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