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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 14:55:47 -0500
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: filesystem capabilities

On Wednesday, November 10, 2010 02:40:14 pm Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 02:18:33PM -0500, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > Not that I know of. The library cannot know what the application's threat
> > model is. The library can make it simple to access the correct things.
> > The following should be the model that I think solves the problem for
> > either setuid or fs based capabilities.
> > 
> > Assuming you needed CAP_CHOWN:
> > 		capng_get_caps_process();
> > 		
> >                 switch (capng_have_capabilities(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS)) {
> > 			
> > 			case CAPNG_FULL:
> > 				capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
> > 				capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE|CAPNG_PERMITTED,
> > 				
> > 						CAP_CHOWN);
> > 				
> > 				if (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH))
> > 				
> > 					exit(0);
> > 				
> > 				break;
> > 			
> > 			case CAPNG_PARTIAL:
> > 				// Paranoid double check that we have what we expect
> > 				if (capng_have_capability(CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, CAP_CHOWN)==0)
> > 				
> > 					exit(0);
> > 				
> > 				// Now to make sure that is ALL that we have...let's drop it and
> > 				// see if we are empty
> > 				capng_update(CAPNG_DROP, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE|CAPNG_PERMITTED,
> > 				
> > 						CAP_CHOWN);
> > 				
> > 				if (capng_have_capabilities(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS) != CAPNG_NONE)
> > 				
> > 					exit(0);
> > 				
> > 				break;
> > 			
> > 			case CAPNG_FAIL:
> > 			
> > 			case CAPNG_NONE:
> > 				exit(0);
> > 		
> > 		}
> > 		// At this point both setuid and fs based caps should have the same
> > 		thing
> 
> What about dropping setuid once it has the needed caps, etc? It seems like
> it'd be nice to have something like:
> 
> validate_I_have_only_these_caps(CAP_WHATEVER);

Validating the caps is what I did in CAPNG_PARTIAL. But for setuid root apps, you 
would have all capabilites. And that is why I have the switch statement above. In that 
case, you would simply drop to the capabilities you needed.


> ...do stuff...
> drop_all_my_privs();

drop all privs is a 2 liner:
capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);
if (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS))
	exit(0);

Not sure anything that small needs a library function.


> and those two routines could be in the cap library, and it would handle
> both fscaps and setuid style of priv escalation.
>
> > You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make them drink.
> > http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-tar/2006-08/msg00004.html
> > 
> > We did our part. Its up to them to accept the patch or keep talking about
> > it. Reading the thread, it sounded like they were going to take it. No
> > idea why they decided against it unless it was seen as a Linux only
> > patch. You might poke them and ask why in the last 4 years they never
> > took the patch. Of course since then we've maintained the patch against
> > current tar releases, so they would want a newer patch.
> 
> Well, I have to disagree here: the job isn't done until it's upstream
> or it has been categorically rejected. At the time they had identified
> real crashes in the code, and were working on it. All this said, anyone can
> drive it, which is why I added the TODO item to Ubuntu's list of what was
> needed for fscaps, and it would be great to try to get it in again. Since
> the fscap push is higher on Fedora's list than Ubuntu's, would it be
> possible to try to push that patch upstream again?

I asked the maintainer if he's had any discussion lately.


> Has there been any discussion of making rsync, cp, and cpio default to
> copying xattrs and acls too? I know at least with rsync they are explicitly
> not included in the "-a" option. :(

My rsync man page shows a -X option and cp has a --preserve=xattr. cpio doesn't but no 
one seems to have been missing that.

-Steve

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