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Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2010 15:06:30 -0400 (EDT)
From: Josh Bressers <>
Cc: coley <>
Subject: Re: CVE request: ettercap GTK

----- "Dan Rosenberg" <> wrote:

> The GTK version of ettercap uses a global settings file at
> /tmp/.ettercap_gtk and does not verify ownership of this file before
> reading it. When parsing this file for settings in gtkui_conf_read()
> (src/interfaces/gtk/ec_gtk_conf.c), an unchecked sscanf() call can
> result in a stack-based buffer overflow.  Local users can place
> maliciously crafted settings files at this location to exploit other
> users who run ettercap.  On most distributions, stack-smashing
> protection will mitigate the impact.  I'm unclear as to whether there
> are settings that could be forced upon other users that make ettercap
> misbehave in a dangerous way.
> There are two issues here (insecure temporary file usage and
> stack-based buffer overflow), but they're probably only
> security-relevant when exploited in conjunction.  Not sure if it
> should get one CVE or two.
> Reference:

We'll use two:

CVE-2010-3843 ettercap GTK insecure temporary file use
CVE-2010-3844 ettercap GTK format string flaw



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