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Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2010 20:30:09 -0700
From: Greg KH <>
To: Joel Becker <>,
	oss-security <>
Subject: Re: Small exposure in ocfs2 fast symlinks.

On Wed, Sep 29, 2010 at 07:04:07PM -0700, Joel Becker wrote:
> Hey Everyone,
> 	We just discovered that ocfs2 could walk off the end of fast
> symlinks -- that is, symlinks that are stored directly in the inode
> block.  ocfs2 terminates these with NUL characters, but a disk
> corruption or an attacker with direct access to the ocfs2 disk could
> overwrite the NUL.  Following the symlink via the filesystem would walk
> off the end of the in-memory block buffer.  We're not sure how
> exploitable this is, but I figured I'd provide a heads-up.  The fix is
> in ocfs2's git tree and will be sent upstream tonight.  Erratas with the
> fix are being built.

Care to send the git commit id to the tree when it
hits Linus's tree so it gets backported there?


greg k-h

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