Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2010 17:20:36 -0400 (EDT) From: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com cc: Guillem Jover <guillem@...ian.org>, Aníbal Monsalve Salazar <anibal@...ian.org>, "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org> Subject: Re: CVE Request -- rpcbind -- Insecure (predictable) temporary file use On Mon, 7 Jun 2010, Josh Bressers wrote: >> On Fri, 4 Jun 2010, Josh Bressers wrote: >> >>> Please use CVE-2010-2061 for this. >> >> My read of Guillem's report at >> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=583435#5 suggests that >> we might have two distinct issues here: >> >> - "*any* user can craft those two files before the daemon has started for >> the first time, which the daemon will parse." Nothing to do with >> symlinks. >> >> - symlinks are followed on creation of those files >> > > I'd not thought of these problems like this. You're probably right as CVE > assignments are for cause, not fix. I was thinking more along the lines of > the fix (store the files somewhere users can't write to) than the problems > (which there are certainly two of). This is the way CVE has evolved over time, to have a preference for the core issue (and maybe we're going overboard the more we learn about how to identify root causes). A good counter-example for the notion of counting by fix would be: a web application is vulnerable to both XSS and SQL injection on the same input, but with a single patch it makes sure that the input is actually numeric. The fix sometimes comes into play when the core problem/attack is not necessarily known. Neither approach is better per se, it's just that for CVE we want to be reasonably consistent with CVE. Generally, one guideline I use is: "if the developer fixes X, then could Y still be a security problem?" If so, then they are treated as distinct issues. > Steve, I'll let you make the call, but I'm currently leaning toward two > IDs. Me too, I'd suggest assigning an ID from your pool. - Steve
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