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Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 11:20:09 +0200
From: Nico Golde <>
Cc: Vincent Danen <>
Subject: Re: debian bug report on bind9 DoS

* Robert Buchholz <> [2009-07-29 00:13]:
> On Tuesday 28 July 2009, Vincent Danen wrote:
> > I don't think
> > it's a huge problem with a well-secured bind9 configuration, but
> > could be quite problematic for bind config's that allow updates
> > without an RNDC key (typical of some dynamic DNS implementations), or
> > on a system that has lax enough permissions that the RNDC key is
> > exposed.
> The crash is not limited to configurations that allow updates.


> The ISC advisory states so as well, and I could reproduce the DoS on a 
> static named instance by removing the "$packet->sign_tsig(...)" line in 
> the exploit. So the scope of this issue is wider than apparent from
> the original report.

Hmm I'd consider that a bug as well or is there a reason why 
bind shouldn't verify update's authorization before 
processing them?

Nico Golde - - - GPG: 0xA0A0AAAA
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