Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2008 15:53:47 +0100
From: Andreas Ericsson <>
To: Eygene Ryabinkin <>
Subject: Re: CVE Request (nagios)

Eygene Ryabinkin wrote:
> Andreas, good day.
> Will you be able to clarify two things.
> Mon, Dec 08, 2008 at 05:19:52PM +0300, Eygene Ryabinkin wrote:
>> So
>> just completely closes the processing of these commands from the
>> Nagios side.  May be this was the fix for the case when the evil
>> contents from the command file were still floating around but the
>> upgraded Nagios won't process them because they could go from the
>> previous successful attack but are lying unprocessed?
> Do you think it is really so?

Umm... I can't parse the above paragraph. In short though, the removed
commands are removed *from the cgi's* because it's far too dangerous
to allow such things over the web. Nagios will still process them if
they are submitted to the command-pipe, but the CGI's can no longer
write such commands to said pipe.

>>> It is a bit strange that it was done after 3.0.5 (CSRF was documented in
>>> 3.0.5 release notes), but...  By the way, entry for CVE-2008-5028 speaks
>>> about 3.0.5 as about the vulnerable to the CSRF and it is inconsistent
>>> with the release notes at
>> So I feel the the CSRF was "somehow closed" in 3.0.5 and CVE entry may
>> need fixing.  The remains from this bug that could migrate from 3.0.5 to
>> 3.0.6 (but not in the functional sense, only via the unprocessed command
>> file) were "fixed" in 3.0.6.
> CVE-2008-5028 really speaks about 3.0.5 as about vulnerable to CSRF.  At
> least CHANGE_ commands were closed in 3.0.5 and were (presumably)
> additionally closed at the Nagios server side in 3.0.6.  So either 3.0.6
> is vulnerable too, 3.0.5 is not vulnerable to CSRF or I am missing
> something.  What to choose?

3.0.5 is vulnerable to CSRF. 3.0.6 (which adds in-form session tokens to
cmd.cgi, which processes all commands from the web-forms), is not vulnerable
to CSRF.

3.0.5 fixes the authorization bypass discussed in CVE-2008-5027, where an
authenticated user can submit commands he/she was not supposed to be able
to submit. However, by blocking the CHANGE_ set of commands, the worst-case
impact of the CSRF was drastically reduced, and the change to blocking those
commands was also a part of 3.0.5.

I'm afraid Ethan (the Nagios maintainer) got it wrong in the changelog,
which is why, I presume, there's so much confusion right now.

I wrote the patches for it though, so I think it's safe to say I know what
patch (and version) fixed what.

Andreas Ericsson         
OP5 AB                   
Tel: +46 8-230225                  Fax: +46 8-230231

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.