Date: Thu, 05 Jun 2008 01:29:04 -0700 From: Ned Ludd <solar@...too.org> To: Robert Buchholz <rbu@...too.org> Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Python Unsafe Module Loading On Thu, 2008-06-05 at 10:10 +0200, Robert Buchholz wrote: > On Wednesday 04 June 2008, Ned Ludd wrote: > > So for nearly every python based program you can simply dump *.so > > *.py *.pyc files just about anywhere on the file system where an > > admin might invoke python. > > As I also pointed out in our bug , this only happens in two cases: > (1) The interactive shell is used to run python code. > (2) A python script resides inside an untrusted directory. > > What I expect to be the most common use case, running python code > from /usr, or /home, is safe. Since all out-of-the-box software would > be installed in directories that are not world-writable, I am tempted > call (2) an error on the user side. Changing the behaviour of python in > this manner would also break existing programs. > > > Robert > >  https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=224925 > Re: (1) How this limited to interactive shells? Our portage/emerge being directly not vuln is left to near sheer luck that Nick.C opted to shove a path into our portage module a-long time ago.. But our tools are questionable as it all depends on load order.. More examples: solar@...ia /tmp $ touch re.so solar@...ia /tmp $ cat foo.py import string print "foo" solar@...ia /tmp $ python foo.py Traceback (most recent call last): File "foo.py", line 1, in ? import string File "/usr/lib/python2.4/string.py", line 83, in ? import re as _re ImportError: /tmp/re.so: file too short solar@...ia /tmp $ ls -l re.so -rw-r--r-- 1 solar solar 0 Jun 5 01:22 re.so (2) yeah that's pretty much 50% of the problem.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.