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Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2016 10:20:40 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: krahmer@...e.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-Request for brltty auth bypass

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> https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=967436

We don't know enough about the deployment of this product to decide
whether a CVE is needed. As far as we can tell, the available
information is:

  - the last release was 5.3.1 on 2015-12-21

  - the vulnerable code was not in that release

  - the vulnerable code was added in
    https://github.com/brltty/brltty/commit/e62b3c925d03239a372d425fb87b2cac65d8ef19
    on 2016-01-28

  - the vulnerable code was fixed in
    https://github.com/brltty/brltty/commit/74affe7d1401f2b43ad32e18cb78704d22604ad7
    on 2016-04-12

  - SUSE Bug 967436 mentions the existence of home:mgorse:branches:hardware but
    doesn't state that this was distributed to any SUSE customers

  - https://github.com/brltty/brltty/blob/master/README doesn't seem to
    have any suggestion that building the latest code from the master
    branch was ever recommended for an end user

We can assign a CVE ID if there's an assertion that it's reasonable to
expect that someone was affected by this vulnerability. Otherwise, we
feel it could be thought of as one of the millions of cases where
potentially unfinished code is added to a master branch of something,
with the expectation that it could be reviewed/revised at some point
before it is released.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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