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Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 22:19:33 -0600
From: Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>
To: cve-assign@...re.org, Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>,
oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request for wget
And 1.7 is now out as well:
https://tails.boum.org/news/version_1.7/index.en.html
With the fix included and documented
On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 2:37 AM, Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>
wrote:
> The fix has been released in 1.7-rc1,
> https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.7-rc1/index.en.html
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 6:10 PM, Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@...onical.com>
>> wrote:
>> > On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 06:57:26PM -0400, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
>> >> If there is any additional Tails vulnerability related to this,
>> >> another CVE ID may be needed. For example,
>> >>
>> >> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-wget/2015-08/msg00050.html
>> >>
>> >> says
>> >>
>> >> to be 100% sure, you should add --passive-ftp to your command line.
>> >> If you don't do that, your /etc/wgetrc or ~/.wgetrc could include
>> >> --no-passive-ftp (or passiveftp = off).
>> >>
>> >> If Tails is supposed to try to ensure that, perhaps there's a
>> >> requirement to have something like:
>> >>
>> >> alias wget="wget --passive-ftp"
>> >>
>> >> in a system-wide location (possibly /etc/bash.bashrc). The concept of
>> >> CVE IDs for "failure of a torify step" issues is new, and we aren't
>> >> sure of the best approach.
>> >
>> > I suspect using a bash alias in a site-wide config might then qualify
>> for
>> > another CVE in the future, along the lines of "programs that spawn wget
>> > via system(3), popen(3), or exec family of functions can use unsafe
>> active
>> > mode by accident". If Tails is in the business of fixing these things
>> > for safety, removing active ftp support from tools seems like better
>> fix.
>> >
>> > Thanks
>>
>> A fix has been applied to Tails git:
>>
>> https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails/repository/revisions/b9fd6312435d55dd0bc0b6abdb7994da4d66e2b2
>>
>> In short, the wget binary is moved to /usr/lib/wget/wget, and a
>> wrapper script is put in place in /usr/bin/wget. The wrapper ensures
>> that wget is called via torsocks, and additionally, also forces
>> --passive-ftp.
>>
>> Moving wget to /usr/lib/wget/wget gets the potentially dangerous wget
>> binary out of $PATH. A dedicated attacker could check if /usr/bin/wget
>> is a script and then parse it to find the actual binary, but that
>> would need to be a very dedicated attacker and at that point, there
>> are more feasible attacks available.
>>
>> --
>> -Austin
>>
>
>
>
> --
> -Austin
>
--
-Austin
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