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Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2015 02:37:08 -0600
From: Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>
To: cve-assign@...re.org, Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>, 
	oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request for wget

The fix has been released in 1.7-rc1,
https://tails.boum.org/news/test_1.7-rc1/index.en.html

On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Austin English <austinenglish@...il.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 6:10 PM, Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@...onical.com>
> wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 01, 2015 at 06:57:26PM -0400, cve-assign@...re.org wrote:
> >> If there is any additional Tails vulnerability related to this,
> >> another CVE ID may be needed. For example,
> >>
> >>   https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-wget/2015-08/msg00050.html
> >>
> >> says
> >>
> >>   to be 100% sure, you should add --passive-ftp to your command line.
> >>   If you don't do that, your /etc/wgetrc or ~/.wgetrc could include
> >>   --no-passive-ftp (or passiveftp = off).
> >>
> >> If Tails is supposed to try to ensure that, perhaps there's a
> >> requirement to have something like:
> >>
> >>   alias wget="wget --passive-ftp"
> >>
> >> in a system-wide location (possibly /etc/bash.bashrc). The concept of
> >> CVE IDs for "failure of a torify step" issues is new, and we aren't
> >> sure of the best approach.
> >
> > I suspect using a bash alias in a site-wide config might then qualify for
> > another CVE in the future, along the lines of "programs that spawn wget
> > via system(3), popen(3), or exec family of functions can use unsafe
> active
> > mode by accident". If Tails is in the business of fixing these things
> > for safety, removing active ftp support from tools seems like better fix.
> >
> > Thanks
>
> A fix has been applied to Tails git:
>
> https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails/repository/revisions/b9fd6312435d55dd0bc0b6abdb7994da4d66e2b2
>
> In short, the wget binary is moved to /usr/lib/wget/wget, and a
> wrapper script is put in place in /usr/bin/wget. The wrapper ensures
> that wget is called via torsocks, and additionally, also forces
> --passive-ftp.
>
> Moving wget to /usr/lib/wget/wget gets the potentially dangerous wget
> binary out of $PATH. A dedicated attacker could check if /usr/bin/wget
> is a script and then parse it to find the actual binary, but that
> would need to be a very dedicated attacker and at that point, there
> are more feasible attacks available.
>
> --
> -Austin
>



-- 
-Austin

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