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Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2015 01:39:48 -0400 (EDT)
From: Siddharth Sharma <siddharth@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org
Subject: Re: CVE Request for glusterfs:  fuse check return
 value of setuid

Can we please get CVE assigned to this flaw. CVE request was made
on 18 August 2015.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
Siddharth Sharma / Red Hat Product Security / Key ID : 0xD9F6489A 
Fingerprint :  0x6F04C684 A49C E4CE 8148 E841 CD6F 8E55 D9F6 489A 


----- Original Message -----
From: "Florian Weimer" <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2015 6:14:51 PM
Subject: Re: [oss-security] CVE Request for glusterfs:  fuse check return value of setuid

* Siddharth Sharma:

> Problem description from the bug: 
>
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1254488
>
> setuid() sets the effective user ID of the calling process.  
> If the effective UID of the caller is root, the real UID and
> saved set-user-ID are also set. On success, zero is returned.
> On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
>
> Note: there are cases where setuid() can fail even when the 
> caller is UID 0; it is a grave security error to omit checking
> for a failure return from setuid(). if an environment limits 
> the number of processes a user can have, setuid() might fail if
> the target uid already is at the limit.
>
> Can we have CVE assigned to this ?
>
> Upstream Ref: 
>
> http://review.gluster.org/#/c/10780/
> https://github.com/gluster/glusterfs/commit/b5ceb1a9de9af563b0f91e2a3138fa5a95cad9f6

Original code:

<http://sourceforge.net/p/fuse/fuse/ci/master/tree/lib/mount_util.c#l103>

Pluse two more locations in that file.

A single CVE ID for all these issues should probably suffice.

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