Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2015 23:52:09 -0500 From: John Lightsey <john@...nuts.net> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: CVE request: Module::Signature before 0.75 - multiple vulnerabilities Hi there, A new version of Module::Signature, was released to fix multiple vulnerabilities. Module::Signature is used by most CPAN clients to validate PAUSE GPG signature files on the CPAN mirrors and GPG signature files inside individual Perl module tarballs. The changelog for the 0.75 version is here: https://metacpan.org/changes/distribution/Module-Signature This commit fixes three flaws: https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/8a9164596fa5952d4fbcde5aa1c7d1c7bc85372f - Module::Signature could be tricked into interpreting the unsigned portion of a SIGNATURE file as the signed portion due to faulty parsing of the PGP signature boundaries. - When verifying the contents of a CPAN module, Module::Signature ignored some files in the extracted tarball that were not listed in the signature file. This included some files in the t/ directory that would execute automatically during "make test" - When generating checksums from the signed manifest, Module::Signature used two argument open() calls to read the files. This allowed embedding arbitrary shell commands into the SIGNATURE file that would execute during the signature verification process. This commit fixes one more flaw: https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/c41e8885b862b9fce2719449bc9336f0bea658ef - Several modules were loaded at runtime inside the extracted module directory. Modules like Text::Diff are not guaranteed to be available on all platforms and could be added to a malicious module so that they would load from the '.' path in @INC. [ CONTENT OF TYPE application/pgp-signature SKIPPED ]
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux - Powered by OpenVZ