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Date: Mon,  6 Apr 2015 16:29:32 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: luto@...nel.org
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, jann@...jh.net
Subject: Re: Linux namespaces: It is possible to escape from bind mounts

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> Do you have a specific scenario in mind?

We think your question is based on a misinterpretation of what we
wrote. To avoid that, we shouldn't have started a sentence with "As
far as we can tell, the patches don't address."

> As far as we can tell, the patches don't address a separate scenario
> in which a ".." attack can occur but the underlying problem is
> something other than rename handling. So, we don't think a second CVE
> ID is needed.

wasn't intended to mean:

  The patches are inadequate because a separate scenario exists,
  and that separate scenario is not addressed by the patches.

Instead, it was intended to mean:

  We are not disputing that the patches are adequate. Also, in our
  current understanding, all attack scenarios ultimately depend on the
  previously incorrect handling of renames. Because there isn't a
  second type of scenario, there isn't a second CVE ID.

- -- 
CVE assignment team, MITRE CVE Numbering Authority
M/S M300
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ PGP key available through http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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