[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 21:24:51 +0200
From: Carlos Alberto Lopez Perez <clopez@...lia.com>
To: Fiedler Roman <Roman.Fiedler@....ac.at>
CC: 766073@...s.debian.org, vserver@...t.linux-vserver.org,
me@...fdog.net, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Multiple disputed issues in util-vserver
On 14/10/14 16:31, Fiedler Roman wrote:
> Hi,
>
> While fixing a bug, I noticed some strange behavior in linux vserver
> virtualization, that I would call a security problems, but project
> developers see it differently. Since the util-vserver packages and patched
> kernel were or are included in some Linux distros, I would be interested in
> the communities' opinion on that.
>
> Issue 1: When calling util-vserver tool on the host to execute a job within
> the guest, e.g. to install updates, the host process (in host PID ns) might
> end up being the child of a guest process (with PID only in guest ns), thus
> the parent PID of the host process pointing to a guest ns PID. If the host
> process wants to signal the parent process or some other tool operates using
> the ppid, a host process might interact with another arbitrary host process
> on error (see [1]). Compared to issue 2-3, I'm not sure for myself if it is
> really a bug and what the correct behavior of kernel with pid namespaces
> would be. At least it breaks bash process handling (gets stuck) when calling
> "vserver exec" in a certain way, start-stop-daemon or upstart might not like
> it also.
>
Is there any (practical) scenario in which an attacker that has
compromised an vserver guest could use this behavior to compromise or
execute code on the host (master)?
> Issue 2: When entering the container from the host or executing commands
> within the container, e.g. to perform common administrative tasks, a
> malicious login shell inside the container might overwrite the
> /usr/sbin/vcontext on the host, thus allowing on to execute arbitrary code
> on the host with root privileges next time vcontext is invoked. See [3].
> Feedback from developer: " Yes, vlogin is known to have several security
> issues. It's a maintenance backdoor, much like the iLO or iDRAC on hardware.
> If you can find ways to improve it, patches would be accepted, but I doubt
> it will ever be possible to do what it does securely." Project documentation
> does not strike out those restrictions (or at least I did not find that or
> the list of "several known security issues" online), other sources, e.g.
> container vs system virtualization comparison strike out the importance of
> the feature to enter a guest from the host easily for maintenance, so I
> guess that those tools were not useful just for me alone. This issue I would
> rate a killer for production use, e.g. for mass hosting.
>
Can you please send me the PoC for this issue ?
> Issue 3: It seems that handling of open tty FDs on enter, that allows to
> inject arbitrary keyboard input to be read by the parent process, also
> affects the tool to start the guest container. This seems to be the same
> issue with "vserver start" as reported in [2] for vserver enter, which was
> classified as less relevant back than. My rating would be little lower than
> 2 but still quite high for mass hosting: manual restart, e.g. during
> maintenance, seems quite common to me.
>
If I understand correctly, this (and the previous one) are
CVE-2005-4890, isn't it?.
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation
> From my point of view, those issues might be expected behavior as claimed by
> the developers, but if so it should be at least stated more clearly in
> documentation:
>
> a) never use any tools except vserver stop (to terminate the container) to
> interact with a running and possibly compromised container from the host
> b) only use network/socket-based tools to connect to processes inside a
> possibly compromised guest, e.g. SSH.
> c) never start a possibly compromised container from interactive shell to
> avoid injection of shell commands
>
> Regarding documentation I would even vote for a solution d), that all those
> tools get a mandatory argument like
> '--i-know-entering-insecure-container-may-kill-my-host' so that it is not
> very likely, that someone will use those tools for something else then
> testing or nice-world administration.
>
> Opinions to issues 1-3?
>
> What about solutions?
>
Halfdog (CC'ed) already suggested some possible solutions:
http://www.paul.sladen.org/vserver/archives/201211/0011.html
> Kind regards,
> Roman
>
> [1]
> http://list.linux-vserver.org/archive?mss:6788:201410:moeiomapkoefmmdnmcji
> [2] http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/11/05/8
> [3] Guest -> Host escape POC: C-code to be put as /bin/bash replacement in
> guest, will overwrite /usr/sbin/vcontext on host. Available on request
>
>
> DI Roman Fiedler
> Scientist
> Safety & Security Department
> Assistive Healthcare Information Technology
>
> AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH
> Reininghausstraße 13/1 | 8020 Graz | Austria
> T +43(0) 50550 2957 | M +43(0) 664 8561599 | F +43(0) 50550 2950
> roman.fiedler@....ac.at | http://www.ait.ac.at/
>
> FN: 115980 i HG Wien | UID: ATU14703506
> http://www.ait.ac.at/Email-Disclaimer
>
Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (884 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
