Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2012 19:22:37 +0000 From: halfdog <me@...fdog.net> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: TTY handling when executing code in different lower-privileged context (su, virt containers) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 During programming experiments I found some class of vulnerabilities , that seem to be rediscovered again from time to time, but since attack value is questionable, it was not fixed yet. The basic idea is, that a program started from interactive shell can access the TTY and also inject input data using TIOCSTI ioctl. This is not an issue when the program is running in the same execution context, but may allow privilege escalation when the program switches to another user context without closing the TTY file descriptors. In that case a malicious program running in the lower privileged context can inject commands to be executed by the interactive shell running with higher privileges. Test were made using 'su' from root to 'test' user, which is vulnerable to that kind of attack. Also entering a virtualization container is a problematic context switch. 'vserver enter'  was found to be vulnerable for command execution outside container while 'lxc-console' was not. At least with 'su', this vulnerability is known for years and still not fixed. In my opinion this is because the fix is not quite trivial and the proposed attack method requires root running interactive shell switching to a problematic user account (user interaction). So the CVSS for this is quite low. I would like to propose following "fix" for this problem: Modification of man-page of su making this a known problem or feature, not a bug. "Using su to execute commands as an untrusted user from an interactive shell may allow the untrusted user to escalate privileges to the user running the shell." For linux-vserver enter I would be interested in opinions if application should be fixed or documentation update is sufficient. - From my point of view, fix would be more appropriate. In both cases, paranoid administrators might decide to use /dev/null as stdin/stdout/stderr when just starting non-interactive programs in different context, while they could replace the privileged shell with exec when interactive context switch is needed (no shell, no escalation). Any opinions on that? hd  http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/  http://linux-vserver.org/ - -- http://www.halfdog.net/ PGP: 156A AE98 B91F 0114 FE88 2BD8 C459 9386 feed a bee -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) iEYEARECAAYFAlCYEdIACgkQxFmThv7tq+5NOwCfUfq0ad9K8xkUYO+Yu0aROzpl ZL0Anjso4tJUcdZcoqkbfeP5aZ7AunUY =7FEy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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