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Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2012 20:29:50 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Damien Stuart <dstuart@...uart.org>, Michael Rash <mbr@...herdyne.org>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- fwknop 2.0.3: Multiple security
 issues

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On 09/19/2012 12:10 PM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
> 
> multiple securit issues have been corrected in 2.0.3 upstream
> version of fwknop
> (http://www.cipherdyne.org/blog/categories/software-releases.html):
>
> 
-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 1) multiple DoS / code execution flaws: Upstream patch: [1]
> http://www.cipherdyne.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=fwknop.git;a=commitdiff;h=d46ba1c027a11e45821ba897a4928819bccc8f22

Ok
> 
yeah this seems to be mostly changes related to char buf[32] to
char buf[ACCESS_BUF_LEN], plus some logic cleanups (like making sure
the port specified is larger than 0 and less than MAX_PORT). So I'll
lump them all together rather than separate them.

Please use CVE-2012-4434 for this issue.

> 2) server did not properly validate allow IP addresses from
> malicious authenticated clients Upstream patch: [2]
> http://www.cipherdyne.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=fwknop.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4c16bc47fc24a96b63105556b62d61c1ba7d799

Stupid
> 
question possibly (didn't look at the code apart from the fix).
I see:

if(char_ctr >= MAX_IPV4_STR_LEN)

but nothing for IPv6 (does fwknopd even support ipv6?)... someone may
want to check that.

Please use CVE-2012-4435for this issue.

> 3) strict filesystem permissions for various fwknop files are not
> verified

This seems more like security hardening. Generally speaking network
daemons are not responsible for ensuring the safety of their own files
(the system should have a sane configuration). Also if I assign a CVE
for this then every single daemon that creates a config file and fails
to check the permissions qualifies for a CVE that's a few hundred
thousand CVEs =). For example: OpenSSH, it has a number of checks on
file permissions, no CVE's for that.

> 4) local buffer overflow in --last processing with a maliciously
> constructed ~/.fwknop.run file Upstream patch: [3]
> http://www.cipherdyne.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=fwknop.git;a=commitdiff;h=a60f05ad44e824f6230b22f8976399340cb535dc

This
> 
is the MAX_CMDLINE_ARGS stuff specifically I assume?

Please use CVE-2012-4436 for this issue.

> For the remaining ones: ======================= 5) several
> conditions in which the server did not properly throw out
> maliciously constructed variables in the access.conf file Upstream
> patch: [4]
> http://www.cipherdyne.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=fwknop.git;a=commitdiff;h=e2c0ac4821773eb335e36ad6cd35830b8d97c75a
>
>  Note: This doesn't look like a security flaw (previously possible
> to provide malicious values to access.conf file, but I assume it
> would required administrator privileges).
> 
> 6) [test suite] Added a new fuzzing capability to ensure proper
> server-side input validation. Note: Test-suite add-on, no CVE
> needed.
> 
> 7) Fixed RPM builds by including the $(DESTDIR) prefix for
> uninstall-local and install-exec-hook stages in Makefile.am. 
> Upstream patch: [5]
> http://www.cipherdyne.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=fwknop.git;a=commitdiff;h=c5b229c5c87657197b0c814ff22127d870b55753
>
>  Note: Also doesn't look like a fix for a security flaw.
> 
> Could you allocate CVE ids for issues 1), 2), 3), and 4) ?
> 
> [Cc-ed Damien and Michael from fwknop upstream to confirm they {the
> first four} should receive a CVE identifier].
> 
> Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat
> Security Response Team
> 


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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