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Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2012 13:19:32 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>, helmut@...divi.de
Subject: Re: CVE Request (minor) -- Two Munin graphing framework
 flaws

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On 04/16/2012 07:54 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
> 
> the following three problems has been recently reported against
> Munin: [1] Insecure temp file use in the qmailscan plug-in:
> 
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=812889 
> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=668778

Please use CVE-2012-2103 for this issue.

> [2] Possibility to inject escape sequences into Munin's log file:
> 
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=812885 
> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=668666

Please use CVE-2012-2104 for this issue.

> [3] Remote users can fill /tmp filesystem: Red Hat would not
> consider this to be a security flaw => no RH BTS entry.
> 
> Original report: 
> http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=668667

I reread this one a few times, I'm not clear on what:

==========
printf 'GET
/cgi-bin/munin-cgi-graph/localdomain/localhost.localdomain/vmstat-day.png?foo
HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: localhost\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' | nc
localhost 80

Provided that the filename actually exists, munin will render the image
==========

means exactly, does the file vmstat-day.png need to exist where? It
seems like if the image is of any size (say 20k or more) the
amplification (each get request = 20k of tmp space usage) and the
files have to be deleted manually it might qualify as a DoS.

helmut@...divi.de can you shed more light on this?

> For the first two -- though both of them having minor security
> impact, under suitable circumstances they could lead to trust
> boundary crossing => under our opinion they should get a
> (CVE-2012-*) identifiers.
> 
> For the third issue -- we wouldn't consider it to be a security 
> flaw. Just as something, which on improperly configured machine 
> could allow to fill in /tmp filesystem (just another way how to do
> it, when the particular service isn't properly configured).
> 
> Could you allocate CVE ids for the first two issues?
> 
> Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat
> Security Response Team


- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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