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Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2018 17:05:32 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, 
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, 
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, 
	linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: Clear the stack

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
>  include/linux/stackleak.h             |  1 +
> [...]
> diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h
> index e2da99b3a191..00d62b302efb 100644
> --- a/include/linux/stackleak.h
> +++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h
> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
>
> +#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
>  /*
>   * Check that the poison value points to the unused hole in the
>   * virtual memory map for your platform.

FYI, I squashed this change into my copy of the stackleak v14 series.
(And I just sent this arm64 patch with the adjustments for it to be
stand-alone.)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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